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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
organizations or individuals. It seems worthy of comment, however,
that an express prohibition against engaging in trading operations does
not appear in our new Non-Profit Corporation Act."
The North Carolina act provides that non-profit corporations may
be formed for any lawful purpose;12 and in order to carry out the
purposes stated in the charter, the power is given to "acquire, own, hold,
improve, use and otherwise deal in and with, real or personal property."' 18
There is a general grant of all powers necessary or convenient to effect
the corporation's purposes,' 4 plus freedom of charter amendment so long
as the charter as amended contains only provisions lawful under the
chapter. 5 The authority to assert lack of power to act is given to the
Attorney General in an action to dissolve the corporation or to enjoin
it from transacting unauthorized business.'8
In conclusion, it appears that the trend toward liberalization of the
ultra vires doctrine as regards business corporations 17 has been carried
over to the non-profit field to a large extent. Perhaps excursions into
the commercial world which are flagrant departures from the purposes
of the corporation will continue to be enjoined; but, at the same time,
it would seem to be growing easier to bring business operations within
the protective veil of things incidental to the non-profit objectives stated
in the charter. The business corporation and private merchant may
well look with disfavor at the type of competition presented by these
"non-profit" corporations.
HAROLD L. WATERS
Criminal Law-Forgery-Use of Fictitious Name
In Hubsch v. United States,' a recent decision from the Fifth Circuit,
the defendant was indicted under the National Stolen Property Act2 on
"1 N.C. GEN. STAT., ch. 55A (Supp. 1957). Although not specifically mentioned
in the case, such a prohibition is set out in the Georgia statute under which the
church in the principal case was incorporated. GA. CODE ANN. § 22-401 (1935).
'
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-5 (Supp. 1957).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-15(b) (1) (Supp. 1957).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-15(b) (8) (Supp. 1957).
1 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-34 (Supp. 1957).
' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-17(3) (Supp. 1957).
7 BALLANTINE, op. cit. Smpra note 1.
1256 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1958).
48 STAT. 794 (1934) (later codified as 18 U.S.C. §§ 2311, 2314-15 (1952 and
Supp. IV 1957)). The portion of § 2314 under which defendant was indicted pro-
vides in pertinent part as follows:
Whoever, with unlawful or fraudulent intent, transports in interstate or
foreign commerce any falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited securities,
knowing the same to have been falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited
[shall be punished].
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two counts of causing3 falsely made and forged4 checks to be transported
in interstate commerce, knowing the same to have been falsely made and
forged.
As to the first count, the following facts were found: the defendant
received treatment at a hospital, representing himself to be "Alfred
Weinstein"-in fact, a fictitious person; in payment for the treatment,
the defendant gave a check signed "A. A. Weinstein" and drawn on a
bank in another state; the check was returned by the bank with the
notation "unable to locate." The court held that these facts were
insufficient to constitute forgery, as required under the act,5 and therefore
that the defendant should be acquitted as to this count.0
With regard to the second count, these facts appeared: the defendant
selected for purchase a Masonic ring at a jewelry store and asked the
jeweler if he could pay for the ring by check; the jeweler replied that
he could do so if he had the proper credentials; the defendant then told
the jeweler that he was a Mason and a Shriner and produced from a
billfold several Masonic cards from Atlanta with the name "Weinstein"
thereon; the jeweler then accepted from the defendant a check in payment
for the ring, with the name "Weinstein" as drawer; this check was also
returned by the out-of-state bank on which it was drawn with the
notation "unable to locate." As to this count, the court seemed to think
the trier of facts might find that the defendant "created a fictional person-
ality of Weinstein, the Mason who desired to purchase the Masonic
ring, and on the faith and credit of a check purporting to be that of
Weinstein the Mason the check was accepted. ' 7 If it were so found,
the court concluded, it would show reliance upon the signature rather
than on the person of the defendant, and a forgery would have been
committed.
That a person may commit forgery by executing an instrument in a
fictitious name is well settled.8 The problem arises in determining under
what circumstances the signing of an assumed or fictitious name to an
One who causes the prohibited transportation is punishable as a principal
under §2314 by virtue of 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (1952). Pereira v. United States, 347
U.S. 1 (1953).
' Forgery may be defined as "the fraudulent making of a false writing having
apparent legal significance." PERxiCs, CamiNAL LAw 291 (1957). The re-
quisites of the offense are (1) a false writing (2) falsely made with intent to de-
fraud and (3) of such a nature that it is a possible subject of forgery, i.e., it
must appear on its face to be a valid instrument. Id. at 292.
1 The courts generally interpret the language of § 2314 quoted in note 2 as
merely importing the common law of forgery. See, e.g., Wright v. United States,
172 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1949) ; Greathouse v. United States, 170 F.2d 512 (4th Cir.
1948). But see Pines v. United States, 123 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1941).
' Although this conduct would almost certainly he punishable either under state
false pretenses or worthless check statutes, federal jurisdiction to prosecute under
§ 2314 would be defeated.
Hubsch v. United States, 256 F.2d 820, 824 (5th Cir. 1958).82 WHARToN, CRImiNAL LAW AND PRocEDuRE § 630 (Anderson ed. 1957).
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instrument is sufficient to constitute the crime.0 This Note will be
limited to a discussion of the problem as it has arisen in some of the
leading cases which have been decided under the National Stolen Proper-
ty Act.10
INSTRUMENT EXECUTED IN FICTITIOUS NAME AND PRESENTED AS
ONE'S OWN. If one executes an instrument in his own name and passes
it off as his own instrument, he is not guilty of forgery.11 Likewise if
one executes an instrument by signing his assumed name and passes
it off as his own instrument, it is not a forgery.12 This rule is illustrated
by United States v. Greever.'s
In that case the defendant was charged with a violation of the
National Stolen Property Act.14 The facts were stipulated: defendant
signed various fictitious names to several checks drawn on a Rhode
Island bank 5 in the presence of the several payees, each of whom knew
the defendant by the particular name signed on the check; the bank had
no account in the name of the defendant or the fictitious drawers; the
defendant represented in each case that he was the person whose signa-
ture appeared on the check and did not represent that the signatures were
of anyone other than himself. The court held that the defendant should
be acquitted.
INSTRUMENT EXECUTED IN NAME OF FICTITIOUS COMPANY BY ONE
IN HIS TRUE NAME. A person may draw a check in the name of a
fictitious company without being guilty of forgery if he signs his own
name along with that of the fictitious company, and the person cashing
the check knows him by that name.' Such were the facts in the leading
case of Greathouse v. United States.17  There the defendant signed
' Some decisions have held that the forgery is complete where a fictitious name
is used, with intent to defraud, and the instrument is capable of being used to the
prejudice of another-the so-called "broad rule." State v. Wheeler, 20 Ore. 192,
25 Pac. 394 (1890) ; State v. Lutes, 38 Wash. 2d 475, 230 P.2d 786 (1951).
Others have restricted the rule so that the signature on the instrument must purport
to be that of another in order to complete the offense-the so-called "narrow rule."
Greathouse v. United States, 170 F.2d 512 (4th Cir. 1948) ; Green v. State, 76 So.
2d 645 (Fla. 1954). The use of the different rules has resulted in many seemingly
inconsistent decisions. See Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 852 (1956).
10 Though thus limited in scope, the discussion is applicable to the common law
of forgery in general. See note 5 supra.
1 Martyn v. United States, 176 F.2d 609 (8th Cir. 1949); Wright v. United
States, 172 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1949) ; Greathouse v. United States, 170 F.2d 512
(4th Cir. 1948) ; United States v. Greever, 116 F. Supp. 755 (D.D.C. 1953) ; United
States v. Gallagher, 94 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Pa. 19S0) ; cf. United States v. Flores,
66 F. Supp. 880 (D. Virgin Islands 1946) ; United States v. Woods, 58 F. Supp.
451 (N.D. W.Va. 1945).
'- United States v. Greever, supra note 11; cf. La Fever v. United States, 257
F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1958).
11116 F. Supp. 755 (D.D.C. 1953).
'18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1952 and Supp. IV 1957).
1 The checks were apparently drawn in the District of Columbia, though the
opinion does not specifically state this.
'" PERRINS, CRIMINAL LAW 297 (1957).
' 170 F.2d 512 (4th Cir. 1948).
[Vol. 37
NOTES AND COMMENTS
several checks "Woodruff Motor Sales, Inc., J. W. Greathouse." He
represented to the person cashing the checks that Woodruff Motor
Sales was the name in which he did business. In fact the motor
company was completely fictitious, and neither it nor the defendant
had an account at the bank on which the check was drawn. The
court held that no forgery had been committed.' 8
The court recognized that forgery can exist when the name used is a
fictitious one, as treated in the succeeding section of this Note; here,
however, although the defendant signed the name of a fictitious company,
the check was accepted on the strength of his apparent authority as agent,
and not in reliance on the name of the company. One treatise explains:
An additional point is to be noted in cases in which one fraudu-
lently purports to act as agent for another. If he has no power or
authority to act in this capacity, the other will not be bound; but
if the signature contains both names and shows that the signer was
purporting to act as agent for the other, the writing is not a
forgery. Strictly speaking there is a false writing in such a case
because it purports to be the instrument of the principal whereas it
is not so in fact; but since any reliance will be upon the implied
warrant of authority clearly manifested by the writing, rather than
upon any deceptive appearance of the writing itself, it is felt not to
come within the type of wrong which forgery is designed to
punish. This is the theory back of the holding that signing a note
in the name of a fictitious firm, purportedly made up of the writer
and another person, is not forgery though done with intent to
defraud. The writing binds the man who wrote it and is false
merely in the implied warrant of authority to bind the other.19
INSTRUMENT EXECUTED IN FICTITIOUS NAME AND NOT PRESENTED
AS ONE'S OWN. One may sign a fictitious name to an instrument and
pass the instrument off as that of the fictitious person. If it is not
signed in the presence of the person defrauded, and it is passed without
reference to any particular person, this has been held to constitute
forgery.20 An example is where an individual draws a check in a
fictitious name, payable to himself, and negotiates the check to a person
who knows him by his true name.21 Or, the defendant may fill in a
fictitious name as payee on a traveler's check and negotiate it purely
" "[T]he charge of forgery in this case is not sustained by the fact that the
defendant, with intent to defraud, drew the checks in his own name upon a bank
in which he had no funds, or that he signed the name of Woodruff Motor Sales,
Inc., whether that was the name in which he did business, as he claimed, or was
merely the name of a non-existent corporation, as indicated by other testimony."
Greathouse v. United States, 170 F.2d 512, 514 (4th Cir. 1948).
" PmuuiNs, CRImiNAL LAW 297 (1957).
"°Rowley v. United States, 191 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1951); Jones v. United
States, 234 F.2d 812 (4th Cir. 1956).
"x Jones v. United States, supra note 20.
1959]
NORTH CAROLINA LA W REVIEW
on the strength of the countersignature and without emphasis on his
own individuality or identity.22
When a fictitious name is signed in the presence of the one de-
frauded, it would seem that something more is required in order to
constitute forgery. The person represented by the fictitious name must
take on personality or character separate and apart from the person
actually presenting the check, so that credit can be extended to such
personality.23 The principal case seems to be the only case under the
act involving this type situation.
In the Hubsch case, the court recognizes the existence of a "broad
rule" and a "narrow rule" defining forgery,24 and in ruling on the
sufficiency of the indictment, expressly rejects the "narrow rule."
However, in ruling on the question of guilt under the facts of the case,
the court makes no attempt to fit the facts into either rule. Instead the
court apparently used as a test the rationale adopted in the early English
case of Regina v. Martin,25 that where the payee in accepting the check
has relied on and given credit to the person presenting the check, as
distinguished from the name or signature, there has been no forgery.20
It would seem that the court correctly applied this theory to the facts
as developed under both counts of the indictment. When the hospital
representative accepted defendant's check in payment for treatment
received, the name "Weinstein," if it meant anything to the hospital, was
important only in so far as it represented the man presenting it; that is,
the individual who had received the treatment. 27 But the jeweler was
not satisfied with accepting the check written by the defendant, a mere
stranger. He accepted the check written by the defendant only after
the defendant had shown him credentials identifying "Weinstein" as a
particular personality-a Mason and Shriner from Atlanta. Relying
on the faith and credit of a check purporting to be signed by "Weinstein,"
the jeweler accepted the defendant's check. Clearly the reliance was not
placed on the person presenting the check (the defendant), but on the
signature as creating a valid obligation.
Rowley v. United States, 191 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1951).
The principle was recognized in England at least as early as 1765 in the
case of Rex v. Dunn, 1 Leach C.L. 57, 168 Eng. Rep. 131 (1765). For an old,
but excellent,- discussion of the principle involved, see Brown, The Forgery of
Fictitious Names, 30 Am. L. REv. 500, 513 (1896).
24 See note 9 supra.
'55 Q.B.D. 34 (1879).
2'In that case the defendant signed a fictitious name to the check, but the
payee, in accepting the check, did not notice that the name was not that of thedefendant. The defendant was well known to the payee and it was clear that thepayee accepted the check as that of the defendant. It was held that the defendant
was not guilty of forgery. Regina v. Martin, supra note 25.
" As the court pointed out: "It does not appear that the Hospital would have
declined to accept the check had it been signed by Hubsch in his own name or in
any other name." Hubsch v. United States, 256 F.2d 820, 824 (5th Cir. 1958).
[Vol. 37
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It is submitted that the test applied in the Hubsch case is in accord
with the technical rules of forgery, and that it is a valid test in
determining whether, under the particular fact situation, the crime of
forgery has been committed by the use of a fictitious name. However,
it may be questioned whether an area already beset with technicalities
and dubious distinctions should be further complicated by revitalizing a
test which originated in the days when forgery was a capital offense.
HENRY E. FRYE
Sales-Liability of Remote Vendor on Implied Warranty
Plaintiff,' a manufacturer of refrigerated biscuits, purchased "Snow
Ice" (an integral part of its biscuits sold for human consumption) from
a distributor, who had bought the product from the defendant ice
manufacturer. Upon finding glass in the ice, plaintiff, at considerable
expense, destroyed the biscuits and biscuit dough and recalled the
biscuits made the previous day with the glass-contaminated dough.
Plaintiff sued the ice manufacturer in federal district court to recover
these expenses. The biscuit company, conceding the lack of contractual
privity with defendant and foregoing the negligence theory, contended
defendant was liable under Texas law by reason of the Decker2 case. In
that case it was held that a non-negligent manufacturer who processed
and sold contaminated food to a retailer for resale and human con-
sumption was liable to a consumer for injuries sustained by him as a
result of eating such food. The court, after noting a trend of the
Texas courts away from the Decker holding, distinguished that case
and held it inapplicable on the ground that it involved a consumer eater
whereas the principal case involved a consumer non-eater.3 The lack
Gladiola Biscuit Co. v. Southern Ice Co., 163 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Tex. 1958).
Jacob E. Decker & Sons. Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942).
"Liability in such a case is not based on negligence, nor on a breach of the usual
implied contractual warranty, but on the broad principle of the public policy to
protect human health and life." Id. at 612, 164 S.W.2d at 829. Thus privity of
contract between plaintiff and defendant is. not necessary under the Decker rule.
I The court may have been influenced by the so-called general rule that there
is no implied warranty of fitness for food where the sale is made by one dealer
to another dealer for purposes of resale, as distinguished from a sale by a dealer
to a buyer for immediate consumption. Howard v. Emerson, 110 Mass. 320
(1872); Emerson v. Brigham, 10 Mass. 197 (1813); Moses v. Mead, 1 Denio
378 (N.Y. 1845) ; 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 242 (Rev. ed. 1948) ; Perkins, Unwhole-
some Food as a Source of Liability, 5 IowA L. BULL. 6, 17-18 (1919) ; Annot., 15
L.R.A. (n.s.) 886 (1908); Annot., 22 L.R.A. 195 (1893); Annot., 14 L.R.A. 494
(1891). Texas has experienced difficulty with this rule, and there are inconsistent
cases dealing with it. Comment, 32 TEXAS L. Ray. 557, 564-66 (1954).
Other jurisdictions hold that the sale by one dealer to another dealer for purposes
of resale carries with it an implied warranty that the goods are wholesome and
fit for food. Annot, 1917F L.R.A. 472. A recent case is Draughon v. Maddox,
237 N.C. 742, 75 S.E.2d 917. (1953), 32 N.C.L. REv. 351 (1954).
No matter which line of cases is accepted, the implied warranty of merchanta-
bility would be equally available in the dealer-to-dealer sale for purposes of resale
